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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. STRINGHAM and 
GALE I. STRINGHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 990630-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Robert W. Stringham appeals from a judgment of conviction for thirteen 
counts of communications fraud, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801 (1990), and one count of racketeering, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1990). Defendant Gale I. Stringham appeals from a 
judgment of conviction for five second degree felony counts of communications fraud and 
one second degree felony count of racketeering. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the 
respective standards of appellate review: 
1 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL. Were defendants entitled to specific performance of a 
tentative plea offer which was, in any event, rescinded by the prosecutor before it was 
submitted to the trial court for approval? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's findings pertaining to the parties' plea 
negotiations are questions of fact reviewable by this Court under a clearly erroneous 
standard. See State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-nine Dollars, United States 
Currency, 791 P.2d 213,216 (Utah App. 1990). The trial court's ruling as to whether or not 
an alleged plea bargain is enforceable is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that whether or not the 
State is entitled to rescind the plea agreement is a question of law). 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL. Having properly instructed the jury regarding the mens 
rea element of communications fraud, was the trial court correct in refusing to give 
defendants' proposed "good faith" jury instruction? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews a judge's refusal to give a jury 
instruction for correctness. State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924,927 (Utah App. 1998); accord State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). 
THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL. Was the evidence sufficient at the close of the State's case 
to warrant proceeding with trial against defendant Gale Stringham., and if so, was the 
evidence sufficient to support her convictions for communications fraud and racketeering? 
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima 
facie case is a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Spainhower, 
2 
1999 UT App. 280, 988 P.2d 452. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's denial of her 
motion to dismiss is reviewed under the same standard as that applied to her claim that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 
1225 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, this Court will uphold the trial court's denial of the motion 
to dismiss, as well as the jury's verdict, "if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences 
that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the Court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from 
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations that are relevant to a 
determination of this case include sections 76-2-103 and 76-10-1801, Utah Code Annotated. 
Section 76-2-103 is set out in Addendum A and Section 76-10-1801 is set out in Addendum 
B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant Robert Stringham was charged by information with thirteen counts of 
communications fraud and one count of racketeering. RS: 1-13; GS: 211-20.1 His wife, 
!The trial court maintained a separate pleadings file for each defendant. In large 
part, the files are identical, containing the original pleading or a copy. Citations generally 
will be to the file containing the original record. Records in Robert Stringham's file will 
be cited as "RS" followed by the record index number (e.g., RS: 12). Records in Gale 
Stringham's file will be cited as "GS" followed by the record index number (e.g., GS: 
12). Testimony at trial will be cited according to the index number assigned to each 
volume of the transcript followed by the internal transcript number (e.g., R. 363: 12). 
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defendant Gale Stringham, was charged with five counts of communications fraud and one 
count of racketeering. RS: 1-13; GS: 211-20. All counts were charged as second degree 
felonies. RS: 1-13. Because all judges of the Fourth District Court were recused from the 
case, and to avoid unnecessary travel by the majority of witnesses, the attorneys for both 
parties, and the judge reassigned to the case, venue was changed from Utah County to Salt 
Lake County and the case was reassigned to the Third District Court. RS: 43-45. Following 
a preliminary hearing, defendants were bound over for trial on all counts. GS: 53-54. 
Four days before the start of trial, defendants filed a Motion to Enforce Plea Bargain 
Agreement. RS: 139-40. The State filed affidavits denying that an agreement was reached, 
GS: 183-86, and, after taking proffered testimony and hearing oral argument, the trial court 
denied the motion. R. 363:3-13. Following a seven-day trial, the jury convicted defendants 
as charged. RS: 282-84; GS: 299-300; R. 368: 1440-44. On defendants' motion and 
pursuant to section 76-3-402, Utah Code Annotated, the trial court entered a judgment of 
conviction for third degree felonies for each charge. RS: 289-90, 321; GS: 335. 
The trial court sentenced defendants to concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years 
on each count, but suspended the prison terms and ordered that defendants serve 60 days of 
home confinement. RS: 319,321-23; GS: 333A, 335. The trial court placed defendants on 
supervised probation for 36 months and ordered each to provide 100 hours of community 
service and pay a $700 fine. RS: 319, 323-24; GS: 333A, 336-37. Both defendants timely 
appealed. RS: 334; GS: 342. 
4 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
UTAH TREATMENT AND ADDICTION HEALTH SERVICES 
Organization. In the fall of 1992, defendants Robert and Gale Stringham, together 
with Carolyn and Bruce Edwards, organized Utah Treatment and Addiction Health Services 
(UTAHS), a business that would provide counseling for those with substance abuse and 
domestic violence problems. R.363:131-33; R. 367:1151. Carolyn Edwards was president 
and Gale Stringham vice-president of the company. R. 363: 133; R. 367: 1255. Although 
Carolyn Edwards was listed as president of UTAHS, she maintained that position in title 
only. R. 363: 133. Defendants controlled and directed the business. R. 363: 133, 225. 
Robert Stringham administered the business operations. R. 363: 133-34. He was generally 
responsible for the company's accounting. R.363:133-34. Compensation for the four was 
not fixed, but determined by Robert Stringham periodically after he paid the organization's 
bills. See R. 363: 225-26. Although Robert Stringham normally handled the billings, Gale. 
Stringham was also aware of the company's billing practices and instructed employees, as 
well as Bruce and Carolyn Edwards, regarding billing procedures. R. 363:133-34,166-67, 
225,241 -42. Carolyn Edwards never handled the billing except as instructed by defendants. 
R. 363: 166-67, 206-07, 224-25. 
Staffing. Both defendants performed counseling services at UTAHS. R. 363: 133, 
142, 144, 146, 153-54. Although Robert Stringham was a certified alcohol and drug 
counselor, he was not licensed by the State in any profession or occupation. R. 364: 306. 
Gale Stringham received her Ph.D. in psychology in 1993 but was not licensed. SE1;R. 364: 
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412-13; R. 367: 1113. However, she was working towards licensure at UTAHS under the 
supervision of Dr. Geri Alldredge, a licensed psychologist. R. 364: 410-11, 415; SE1. 
Carolyn Edwards was a certified alcohol and drug counselor, but was not licensed by the 
State in any profession or occupation. R. 363: 130,138; SE1. 
UTAHS hired William Seifrit, Shauna Orullian, Mark Hibler, Beverly Edington, and 
Deborah Class as counselors, none of whom were licensed in any profession or occupation. 
R. 363:142,175,227-28; R. 364:454; R. 365:568-69; SE1. UTAHS also retained a number 
of college interns, who were also unlicensed, to assist in the counseling, including Susan 
Hollenbeck, Annette Proctor, Kenneth Seely, Clifford Harris, and Eric Ewell. R. 363:203-
04,228; R. 366:971,996,1018.2 Although she was not licensed, Gale Stringham supervised 
Harris and Ewell who conducted group therapy sessions for children, R. 366: 1020-21. 
Dr. Charles Walton. In December 1992, UTAHS retained the services of Dr. Charles 
Walton to co-facilitate domestic violence groups on Wednesday nights with Carolyn 
Edwards. R. 363: 135-38, 181; R. 366: 906. In exchange for Dr. Walton's services and 
pursuant to his request, UTAHS provided Dr. Walton with health insurance coverage. R. 
363:138. Although Dr. Walton did not have any training in domestic violence counseling, 
as a licensed physician, he supervised Carolyn Edwards in their Wednesday night groups. 
R. 366: 909-13. Dr. Walton did not participate in any other groups or supervise any other 
person. R. 363:139; R. 366:912-13. On rare occasions, Dr. Walton consulted with a patient 
2Although Susan Hollenbeck was a licensed social worker (LSW) in 1993, she did 
not become a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW) until 1995. R. 366: 996; SE1. 
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referred to him by other counselors to determine whether the patient needed a prescription 
for an anti-depressant or Antabuse. R. 366: 914, 959. 
At Robert Stringham's request, Dr. Walton provided him with a signature stamp to 
make it easier for defendant, who handled billing in Orem, to bill Dr. Walton's patients. R. 
366: 919-20.3 Dr. Walton made it clear to defendant that the stamp was only to be used for 
billings pertaining to clients whom Dr. Walton was personally treating, either in group 
therapy with Carolyn Edwards, or in the rare cases of individual counseling. R. 366:919-20. 
Dr. Walton did not authorize use of his stamp to endorse checks made payable to him. R. 
366:925. Indeed, he was unaware that insurance claims would be submitted under his social 
security number or that any checks from insurance carriers would even be made out to him. 
R. 366: 925-27, 945. 
Contract to Provide Counseling for Domestic Violence Offenders. In November 
1992, UTAHS procured a contract with the Utah State Department of Human Services 
("DHS") to "provide domestic violence therapy to victims, perpetrators, and children." R. 
366: 1047; DE81. As such, UTAHS provided counseling to perpetrators of domestic 
violence who had been ordered by a criminal court to undergo counseling as a result of the 
Cohabitant Abuse Act. DE81 (Attachment E, % 4); see also R. 363:236; R. 366:943,1003; 
R. 367: 1163. Under the DHS Contract, UTAHS represented that it met "all applicable 
3Robert Stringham told Dr. Walton that he needed the stamp because there were 
"quote, 'a few clients'—coming through who had insurance" and that it would be helpful 
to have his stamp so defendant could stamp the claim forms when those clients' names 
came through. R. 366: 920. 
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licensing or other standards required by Federal and State laws or regulations" and agreed 
that it would "continue to comply with such licensing or other applicable standards" for the 
duration of the contract. DE81 (Attachment B, <§ 1). 
Licensing Requirements. When UTAHS was initially organized in 1992, the State 
had no licensing requirements for domestic violence counseling. R. 364:303-04, 306-08. 
However, in November 1992, a rules committee, which included Robert Stringham, proposed 
rules regulating domestic violence counseling. R. 363: 303-04; SE15. The proposed rules 
went into effect on December 15, 1992 following the statutory public comment period and 
remained consistent through at least February 1994. See R. 365: 547-49, 562. The rules 
required that domestic violence treatment be given by a licensed physician, psychologist, 
clinical social worker (LCSW), psychiatric nurse, or marriage and family therapist 
(collectively referred to herein as "licensed professionals"). R. 364: 307-08; SE15; Utah 
Admin. Code R501-3-4 (1993). A graduate student working toward licensure could also 
provide treatment, as could a licensed social services worker, so long as they did so under 
the supervision of a licenced professional. SE15; Utah Admin. Code R501-3-4 (1993). 
PATIENT BILLINGS 
William Carter. William Carter was court-ordered to undergo domestic violence 
treatment with UTAHS in February 1993. R. 364:462-63,470. Carter quit attending group 
counseling after the fifth or sixth session, but later resumed the therapy when the criminal 
court again ordered him to do so. R. 364: 464, 466, 474-75. The counselors who led 
Carter's group sessions were not licensed to provide the domestic violence counseling. 
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Carolyn Edwards performed Carter's initial "intake" and sat in on some of the group therapy 
sessions, but did not lead the sessions. R. 364:477-78. Defendant Robert Stringham led the 
first few sessions. R. 364:465. Bill Seifrit, a Ph.D. in communications, led the balance of 
the group sessions attended by Carter. See R. 363:135,142,175,227; R. 364:454,477-78; 
R. 365:568. Dr. Walton did not attend or otherwise supervise any of the counseling. R. 363: 
139; R. 364:467; R. 366: 912-13. 
UTAHS submitted bills for Carter's therapy to Jenson Administrative Services 
("JAS"), a third-party administrator of Carter's employee insurance fund. R. 364:485,488. 
The JAS policy dictated that only individual therapy by a physician or licensed therapist be 
paid; JAS did not pay for group therapy. R. 364: 493, 495-96, 499. Although Carter 
participated only in group therapy, UTAHS billed his insurance provider for fifteen 
individual psychotherapy sessions plus his initial intake. See R. 364: 488-89; SE18. 
Moreover, UTAHS identified Dr. Walton as the person who provided the counseling even, 
though he provided neither group nor individual counseling. R. 364: 494. In all, UTAHS 
billed Carter's insurance provider $1,440. R. 364: 496; SE18. 
Marty Hooker. Marty Hooker obtained counseling for domestic violence at UTAHS 
at the suggestion of his employer. R. 364:510-11. Hooker attended approximately 26 group 
therapy sessions from March to November 1993. R. 364:511,515,526; SE22. Hooker paid 
$15 per session and his insurance carrier, PEHP, generally paid $40 per session. R. 364: 
515-16; SE 22. Dr. Walton did not provide any counseling in the group therapy sessions 
attended by Hooker. R. 364:513-14. Nonetheless, UTAHS submitted claim forms to PEHP 
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representing that Dr. Walton provided the counseling or supervised the counseling. R. 364: 
527; SE22. PEHP would not have paid for the services had it known that Dr. Walton neither 
provided the counseling nor supervised the services. R. 364: 527. In all, UTAHS billed 
PEHP $840, $370 of which was paid by the insurance provider. R. 364: 528; SE22. 
Anthony Weed. Pursuant to a court order, Anthony Weed began attending group 
counseling for domestic violence in March 1993. R. 365: 590-91. Weed attended weekly 
group therapy intermittently for at least six months. R. 365: 592, 594; SE20. Weed made 
a $10 co-payment to UTAHS on each visit and the remainder was billed to his insurance 
carrier, IHC. R. 365: 593; SE20. He received no counseling whatsoever from Dr. Walton,-
nor did he receive any counseling from Carolyn Edwards. R. 364:513-14; 365:593,597-98. 
Nevertheless, UTAHS represented to IHC on the claims forms that Dr. Walton provided the 
counseling. R. 365: 602-05, 612; SE20. IHC would in no case pay a claim for therapy 
provided by an individual who was not licensed or under the immediate personal supervision 
of someone who was licensed. R. 365:602-03,622-23. In all, UTAHS billed IHC $600 for 
15 group therapy sessions. R. 365: 603-04; SE20. IHC did not pay any claim submitted by 
UTAHS in this case because Dr. Walton was not a contracted IHC provider. R. 365: 604; 
SE20. Because Dr. Walton was a licensed physician, he would have otherwise qualified for 
payment but for the fact that he did not have a contract with IHC. R. 365: 617-18. 
Jan Kohler Thorn. UTAHS invited Jan Kohler Thorn to attend group counseling 
after her husband had been court-ordered to attend. R. 365: 635. Defendant Robert 
Stringham led the group therapy sessions and he was assisted by an intern, but no one else. 
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R. 365:638-39,642,649. Defendant Robert Stringham represented to the group that he was 
a "Ph.D." and a licensed therapist and that they could call him "Dr. Bob." R. 365: 640. 
Carolyn Edwards provided some individual therapy to Thorn for her depression. R. 365: 
648, 656-57. In all, Thorn received counseling from UTAHS for approximately fifteen 
months. R. 365:656. UTAHS billed Crime Victims Reparations (CVR) $720 for 18 group 
therapy sessions and $1,200 for 15 individual therapy sessions. SE28. Although CVR did 
not receive or approve a treatment plan, the bill submitted by UTAHS to CVR represented 
that Dr. Walton provided the counseling. R. 365: 699-700; see SE28.4 Although CVR 
generally does not make payments without approving a treatment plan, it nevertheless paid 
UTAHS $1,440 in claims. R. 365: 699, 702; SE28. Had CVR known that Dr. Walton did
 y 
not conduct the therapy sessions, it would not have paid for the counseling. R. 365: 700. 
Lona Allen. For just over a year, Lona Allen received group therapy at UTAHS with 
her husband who had been court-ordered to receive counseling. R. 365: 659-60. She* 
received group alcohol abuse counseling on Mondays from Carolyn Edwards and group 
domestic violence counseling on Wednesdays from both Dr. Walton and Carolyn Edwards. 
R. 365: 662-63, 679-80.5 She never received any therapy from Defendant Gale Stringham 
or Dr. Geri Alldredge. R. 365: 665. Nevertheless, defendant Gale Stringham submitted a 
4Although the Active Patient Ledger submitted with the bill indicated that Kohler 
attended one individual therapy session with defendant Gale Stringham, it does not 
appear that UTAHS billed CVR for that particular session. See SE28; see also R. 365: 
700. 
5Allen testified that Dr. Walton conducted the Wednesday night therapy sessions 
"sometimes/' R. 365: 679-80. 
11 
treatment plan to C VR representing that she had and would provide the counseling under the 
supervision of Dr. Geri Alldredge. See R. 365: 689-91; SE27. Had CVR known that 
defendant Gale Stringham had not provided any of the services or that Dr. Alldredge had not 
supervised any of the counseling, it would not have paid the claims and CVR would have 
required the submission of a new treatment plan for review. R. 365: 691. The bills 
submitted by UTAHS to CVR also indicated that defendant Gale Stringham had provided 
the counseling services. R. 365: 695; see also Active Patient Ledgers attached to SE27. In 
all, CVR paid the entire $2,405 billed by UTAHS for counseling services. R. 365: 697. 
Ken Fisk. Pursuant to a court order, Ken Fisk attended group counseling for domesticc 
violence at UTAHS for approximately six months beginning in March 1993. R. 365: 732. 
Defendant Robert Stringham and Carolyn Edwards led the group therapy sessions and they 
were usually joined by an intern. R. 365: 735, 752. Dr. Walton did not conduct any of the 
therapy sessions. R. 364: 513-14; R. 365: 736. Fisk made a $20 co-payment to UTAHS for 
each session and the balance was submitted to his insurance carrier, First Health. R. 365: 
735, 749. Although Dr. Walton neither provided any counseling nor supervised any 
counseling, UTAHS submitted eleven claims for nineteen dates of service representing that 
Dr. Walton provided the services. R. 365: 757; SE32. In all, UTAHS billed First Health 
$1,005 for services by Dr. Walton. R. 365: 758; SE32. First Health paid UTAHS $302.50. 
R. 365:758; SE32. Had First Health known that Dr. Walton did not provide or supervise the 
services, it would not have paid any of the claims. R. 365: 758, 774. 
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Debbie Frank. Debbie Frank attended group counseling for domestic violence with 
her husband Ken Fisk. R. 365: 781. Dr. Walton did not conduct or otherwise attend any of 
the therapy sessions involving Frank. R. 365:785. After attending just five sessions, Frank 
quit attending, walking out on the fifth session because she was upset that the counselors 
made her feel that she was at fault for her husband's violence against her. R. 365: 784-85, 
793,798-800. Frank's husband, Ken Fisk, handled the insurance claims for Frank. R. 365: 
784-85. Defendant Robert Stringham, who asked the group to call him Dr. Stringham, 
conducted the therapy sessions attended by Frank, and Carolyn Edwards assisted Stringham. 
R. 365: 784, 811. Nevertheless, defendant Gale Stringham submitted a treatment plan to 
CVR representing that she had provided the counseling under the supervision of Dr. Geri 
Alldredge. See R. 365: 692; SE29. In all, UTAHS billed CVR $505 for 10 counseling 
sessions, only five of which Frank actually attended. R. 365: 697-98; SE29.6 Had CVR 
known that defendant Gale Stringham did not provide any of the services or that Dr. 
Alldredge had not supervised any of the counseling, it would not have paid the claims. R. 
365: 691-92. UTAHS also billed First Health for the same therapy, again representing that 
Dr. Walton provided or supervised the therapy. R. 365: 759-60; SE31. First Health paid 
$302.50 of those claims. See SE31. Had First Health known that Dr. Walton did not provide 
or supervise the therapy, it would not have paid any of the claims. R. 365: 760. 
6Although defendant Gale Stringham billed CVR $245 for an initial intake on 
March 17, 1993, Frank testified that she simply attended group therapy on that day. R. 
365: 789-90; SE29. 
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Richard McGuire and Children. Pursuant to a court order, Richard McGuire 
received group counseling for domestic violence at UTAHS from April 1993 to January 
1994. R. 366: 824,831. His children also received group counseling at UTAHS during that 
period. R. 366: 825-27, 831. McGuire made a $5 or $10 co-payment on each visit and the 
remainder was billed to his insurance carrier, Educators Mutual. R. 366: 829. In all, 
UTAHS billed Educators Mutual $2,720 for group therapy received by McGuire and four of 
his children. R. 366: 852-53. Educators Mutual paid UTAHS $1,240 on those claims. R. 
366: 852-53. Carolyn Edwards usually provided McGuire's therapy. R. 366: 827. Dr. 
Walton never provided or supervised any therapy for McGuire or his children. R. 364:513-
14; R. 366: 827,830. Nonetheless, in each of the forty-six claims, UTAHS represented that 
Dr. Walton provided or supervised the therapy, and as a result, Educators Mutual made each 
of the checks payable to him. R. 366: 847-48, 857; SE34-38. Educators Mutual pays only 
for therapy provided by licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, physicians, and clinical social 
workers. R. 366: 855. Educators Mutual would not have paid the claims had it known that 
the therapy was not provided or supervised by Dr. Walton. R. 366: 848-51, 855. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Alleged Plea Agreement Defendant has failed to demonstrate clear error in the trial 
court's finding that no plea agreement was reached. The prosecutor's offer was tentative and 
did not include all the necessary details of a plea agreement, such as the payment of 
restitution. Moreover, a binding plea agreement was not entered because it was never 
presented to the trial court for approval. Defendants' convictions were not the result of the 
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wrongful inducement of a plea offer by the prosecution, but they were result of a duly 
rendered jury verdict. Accordingly, defendants suffered no prejudice from the prosecutor's 
withdrawal of the tentative offer and they have no constitutional right to specific 
performance of any alleged agreement. 
Proposed Good Faith Instruction, The trial court adequately instructed the jury 
regarding the requisite mental state required to find defendants guilty of communications 
fraud. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict could only be rendered if the State 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the representations or material omissions were made 
or omitted by defendants intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
The trial court then gave the jury detailed instructions regarding each mental state under 
which defendants could be convicted. These instructions, taken as a whole, provided 
defendants with the necessary framework to assert their good faith defense. Such a holding 
is consistent with the overwhelming majority of federal courts of appeals that have addressed 
the issue. 
Sufficiency of the State's Evidence. Reviewing the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the guilty 
verdict, the State presented sufficient evidence in its case in chief to warrant submission of 
the matter to the jury. Defendant controlled and directed UTAHS with her husband and 
specifically instructed an employee who did billing for the company to identify Dr. Walton 
as the service provider even though Dr. Walton did not conduct or supervise the counseling. 
Such evidence was more than sufficient to proceed with the trial. Moreover, defendant's 
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claim that she honestly believed it was standard practice to identify the medical director as 
the service provider was not supported by the State's evidence nor defendant's expert. 
Accordingly, the evidence was also sufficient to support the jury verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
A TENTATIVE PLEA OFFER WHICH WAS RESCINDED BY THE 
PROSECUTOR BEFORE IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR APPROVAL. 
Without citing to the record, defendants allege that through their attorney, they 
accepted a plea offer from the prosecutor which would have resulted in defendant Robert 
Stringham's guilty plea to three third degree felony counts and in the court's dismissal of the 
remaining charges, including all counts against defendant Gale Stringham. Aplt. Brf. at 5, 
7-8. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to order specific performance 
of the alleged plea agreement between defendants and the prosecutor. Aplt. Brf. at 7. 
Defendants' claim fails on two fronts. First, defendants do not demonstrate clear error in the 
trial court's finding that a final agreement was not reached. Second, even had an agreement 
been reached between the parties, it is not enforceable because it had never been presented 
to and accepted by the trial court. 
A. The Trial Court's Finding that No Plea Agreement Was Reached Was 
Not Clearly Erroneous. 
In seeking specific performance of the alleged plea agreement, defendant submitted 
to the trial court an affidavit from his defense attorney stating that the prosecutor and defense 
counsel agreed that the three-count plea by defendant Robert Stringham would be "an 
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appropriate disposition of the case." RS: 145. Defense counsel stated that at the prosecutor's 
request and "to avoid any misunderstandings," he signed the yellow pad where the prosecutor 
had written the terms of the contemplated agreement. RS: 145-46. Finally, defense counsel 
alleged that after obtaining his clients' consent, he left a message on the prosecutor's voice 
mail indicating defendants' "acceptance of the plea bargain agreement." RS: 146. The State, 
however, disputed defendants' allegations of an acceptance.7 The prosecutor's paralegal, 
who retrieved defense counsel's voice mail message, maintained that defense counsel "did 
not affirmatively accept the plea offer," but simply said, "I think we're close on the plea 
agreement." R. 363: 12; GS: 186; RS: 146. 
On the day of trial, the court heard argument on the motion. R. 363: 3-13. In 
proffering his own testimony, defense counsel described the nature of the plea negotiations. 
R. 363: 8. He represented to the court that he told the prosecutor he would "have to talk to 
[his] clients but [he] thought that [the three-count plea] might possibly work." R. 363:7. He 
represented that after obtaining defendants' consent, he left a message at the telephone 
number provided by the prosecutor indicating: "I believe we've got a deal. I talked my 
clients into it. Let's get together." R. 363: 8-9. Based on the foregoing, the trial court 
denied the motion, finding that "there wasn't an unequivocal acceptance of the offer." See 
R. 363: 10. 
7The State also disputed that a firm plea offer had been made. RS: 184. The trial 
court, however, did not expressly reach that issue. See R. 363: 3-13. 
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The trial court's determination that the voice mail message did not constitute an 
acceptance is a finding of fact which will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Cal 
Wadsworth Const, v. City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995); see also Nine 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-nine Dollars, 791 P.2d at 216 (holding that the trial court's 
findings pertaining to a prosecutor's plea agreement based on extrinsic evidence will not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous). Under contract law, "[a]n acceptance is a manifestation 
of assent to an offer, such that an objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding 
that a fully enforceable contract has been made." Cal Wadsworth, 898 P.2d at 1376. An 
offer does not become binding until the offeree affirmatively and unequivocally accepts the 
offer. SeeRJ. Daum Const Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194,200,247 P.2d 817,820 (Utah 1952) 
(holding that an acceptance "must be clear, positive and unambiguous"). A review of the 
facts before the court reveals that the trial court's ruling was supported by the evidence. 
In this case, the prosecutor denied receiving any form of acceptance from defense 
counsel. GS: 184. The prosecutor's paralegal further stated in her affidavit that in defense 
counsel's voice mail message, he only said that he thought they were "close on the plea 
agreement." GS: 186. Although defense counsel denied in his proffer that he only indicated 
they were "close" to a deal, R. 363: 9-10, his proffer retreated from the language of his 
affidavit. In his proffer, defense counsel represented that he said in his message: "I believe 
we've got a deal. I talked my clients into it. Let's get together." R. 363: 8-9. Thus, 
counsel's statement that he "believed" they had a deal suggested that although a plea 
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agreement appeared probable, some doubt remained. Accordingly, he asked that the two 
sides get together again. 
In light of the foregoing, it was not clear error for the trial court to find that defense 
counsel's voice mail message did not constitute an unequivocal acceptance so as to create 
a binding plea agreement. It cannot be said that defense counsel's message was "such that 
an objective, reasonable person [would be] justified in understanding that a fully enforceable 
contract [had] been made." Cal Wadsworth, 898 P.2d at 1376. 
The trial court also concluded that the parties' failure to discuss the terms of 
restitution was fatal to a finding of a final agreement. R. 363:10-11. The court's conclusion 
that failure to reach agreement on such an essential term as restitution is supported by 
contract law. Where "'the preliminary agreement is incomplete, it being apparent that the 
determination of certain details is deferred until the writing is made out[,]... the preliminary 
negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract.'" Daum Const., 247 P.2d at 200 
{quoting Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, Sec. 26). Defense counsel's 
message indicating that he again wanted to "get together" on the matter supports a conclusion 
that not all the necessary details had been finalized, at least one of which was the payment 
of restitution. 
In short, resolving all disputed evidence "in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination," the trial court's finding that defendants did not accept the alleged plea offer 
was adequately supported by the record and this Court should therefore affirm the court's 
decision. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
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B. Defendants Have No Constitutional Right to a Plea Agreement That 
Was Not Presented to or Accepted by the Trial Court. 
In any event, the application of contract law to plea agreements is inherently limited 
because plea agreements are not contracts. Patience, 944 P.2d at 387. The underlying right 
implicated in a plea agreement is constitutionally based rather than contractually based. Id. 
Therefore, the enforceability of an alleged plea agreement must be examined under the 
constitution. Id. Although "'[p]rinciples of contract law provide a useful analytical 
framework' in cases involving plea agreements,... [they] 'cannot be blindly incorporated 
into the criminal law in the area of plea bargaining.'" Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 {quoting 
United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also State v. Gladney, 951 
P.2d 247,248 (Utah App. 1998) (observing that "[c]ontract analysis has some application to 
plea agreements"). 
Defendants contend that specific performance of the alleged plea agreement is 
required under the "fundamental right to fairness" guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution. See Aplt. Brf. at 8-9. Defendants'contention is without support. The seminal 
decision addressing a defendant's right to enforce a plea offer that is rescinded after 
acceptance by the defendant is Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543 (1984). In 
Mabry, the prosecutor offered to make a favorable sentencing recommendation if the 
defendant pled guilty to the charge of accessory after a felony murder. Three days later, 
defense counsel informed the prosecutor that his client accepted the offer. Id. at 506, 104 
S.Ct. at 2545. After defense counsel communicated his client's acceptance of the offer, the 
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prosecutor withdrew the offer and made a counteroffer involving a less favorable sentencing 
recommendation. Id. The defendant initially rejected the latter offer and proceeded to trial. 
Id at 506,104 S.Ct. at 2545-46. However, when the judge declared a mistrial on the second 
day of trial, the defendant accepted the offer and the court sentenced him accordingly. Id. 
On appeal from the denial of defendant's federal habeas petition, the Supreme Court 
upheld the conviction, rejecting the defendant's claim that constitutional "'fairness' 
precluded the prosecution's withdrawal of a plea proposal once accepted" by defendant. Id. 
In so concluding, the High Court held that "[a] plea bargain standing alone is without 
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied 
in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other 
constitutionally protected interest." Id. at 507-08, 104 S.Ct. at 2546 (footnote omitted). 
Although the defendant's conviction in Mabry was based on a plea rather than a jury 
verdict as in this case, his complaint on appeal was no different than that of defendants 
here-the lost opportunity of a more favorable outcome. The Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant's complaint in Mabry because the "plea was in no sense induced by the 
prosecutor's withdrawn offer," and therefore was "in no sense the product of governmental 
deception." Mabry, 467 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 2548. Likewise, defendants' conviction 
in this case was in no sense the product of government wrongdoing, but rather the result of 
the duly rendered verdict of a jury. Accordingly, this Court should also reject defendants' 
claim. 
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Citing to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Cooper, 594 
F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979), defendants contend that they have a constitutional right to 
enforcement of the alleged plea agreement even though it was not presented to and accepted 
by the trial court. See Aplt. Brf. at 9. Defendants do not acknowledge Mabry nor do they 
acknowledge the Fourth Circuit's subsequent conclusion that Mabry" overruled [its] decision 
in Cooper." Plaster v. United States, 789 F.2d 289, 292-93 (4th Cir. 1986). In so 
concluding, the Fourth Circuit held that under Mabry, "a criminal defendant's acceptance of 
a prosecutor's proposed plea bargain does not create a constitutional right to have the bargain 
specifically enforced where the prosecutor withdraws the offer prior to the acceptance of the 
guilty plea." Id. 
Defendants reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971), is also misplaced. See Aplt. Brf. at 8-9. In Santobello, the 
prosecutor recommended that defendant be sentenced to the maximum one-year term even 
though the defendant had entered a guilty plea more than six months earlier based on the 
State's agreement not to make a sentencing recommendation. Id. at 258-59,92 S.Ct. at 497. 
The High Court reversed the defendant's conviction because the plea was obtained by the 
State's inducement. Id. at 261,92 S.Ct. at 499. Unlike Mabry and the facts of this case, the 
defendant's conviction in Santobello was the product of governmental inducement. As such, 
Santobello is inapposite. As held by the Supreme Court in Mabry, the Constitution "is not 
a code of ethics for prosecutors; its concern is with the manner in which persons are deprived 
of their liberty." 467 U.S. at 511, 104 S.Ct. at 2548. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that "plea agreements are binding on the parties and 
the court once the plea is entered and accepted." State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 
1986). As discussed above, Mabry makes clear that a plea agreement is not binding until the 
plea is entered and accepted. That ruling is consistent with this Court's decision in State v. 
Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 929 P.2d 250 (Utah 1996), in which 
the Court held that "so long as defendant took no actions in reliance on the illegal plea 
agreement which would substantially affect a retrial, defendant is not prejudiced." 
Defendants can claim no prejudice here. Defendants have no inherent right to a plea 
bargain. United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316,325 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, even where 
"the government and the defendant reach a plea agreement, the court is not required to accept 
it." Id. Given the authority of a trial court to reject a plea agreement, defendants cannot 
complain that they have suffered prejudice by a rescission which occurred before the plea 
agreement was ever presented to the trial court for approval. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED GOOD FAITH INSTRUCTION. 
Defendants maintained at trial that they believed it was proper for them to bill all 
services provided in their Salt Lake office under Dr. Walton's name because he was the 
purported medical director of UTAHS. R. 367: 1126. On appeal, defendants contend that 
the trial court erred in refusing to give defendants' proposed "good faith" instruction, which 
read: "You are instructed that a representation that is made by an individual who has a good 
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faith belief in the correctness or truth of the representation is not a fraudulent representation." 
GS: 166. Defendants' claim lacks merit. 
"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the 
case." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238. Accordingly, the trial court "can refuse to give an 
instruction that misstates the law." Id. On the other hand, "[i]f there is sufficient evidence 
to justify a proposed jury instruction on any given issue, the trial court has a duty to 
adequately instruct the jury on that issue." State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052,1058 (Utah 1985). 
Nevertheless, "the framing of instructions lies in the trial judge's discretion." State v. 
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,266 (Utah 1988). A trial court's instructions are adequate so long 
as they "g[ive] defendant the legal framework for his theory of the case." Id. 
An examination of the instructions in this case reveals that the trial court adequately 
instructed the jury, correctly advising them on the law and allowing defense counsel to argue 
his theory of the case. Defendants were charged with devising a scheme to obtain money 
from insurance providers by knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly making false or 
fraudulent representations on the claim forms. GS: 244-79; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801 (1990). Whether or not defendants had a good faith belief that it was proper for 
them to stamp Dr. Walton's signature on claim forms directly goes to the issue of intent and 
was therefore adequately covered in the instructions regarding the requisite intent. 
The State concedes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
required a separate good faith instruction in criminal cases that involve intentional or willful* 
misconduct. See United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534,1547 (10th Cir. 1992) (charging 
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misapplication of bank funds). However, as the Tenth Circuit observed in Haddock, the 
overwhelming majority of federal circuits have not so required.8 Haddock, 956 F.2d at 1548 
n. 11; see, eg,, United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152,154-55 (1 st Cir. 1991) (charging mail 
and wire fraud); United States v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1026 (2nd Cir. 1990) (charging 
misapplication of bank funds); United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1102-03 (3rd Cir.) 
(charging defendant with willfully making false statements to the SEC), cert, denied, 506 
U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 439 (1992); United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 316-17 (4th Cir. 
1991) (charging conversion of United States property); United States v. Giraldi, 86 F.3d 
1368,1376 (5th Cir. 1996) (charging bank fraud and willful misapplication of bank funds); 
United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1984) (charging fraud), cert, 
denied, All U.S. 1004,105 S.Ct. 1866 (1985); United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389,394-95 
(7th Cir.) (charging mail fraud), cert, denied,—U.S.—, 120 S.Ct. 132(1999); United States 
v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1984) (charging mail fraud), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 
925, 106 S.Ct. 259 (1985); United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(charging bank fraud and wire fraud); United States v. Gambler, 662 F.2d 834,837 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); compare United States v. Casperson, 113 F.2d 216,223-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (requiring 
good faith instruction in mail and wire fraud case) with United States v. Ribaste, 905 F.2d 
1140, (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's proposed good faith instruction and finding "no 
8Because the proposed instruction does not involve an issue implicating the federal 
constitution, the Tenth Circuit's holding is no more persuasive than the opinions of other 
federal circuit courts on the matter. Moreover, as explained infra, at 26-27, the rationale 
of the majority is consistent with this Court's analysis of jury instructions. 
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difficulty in concluding that the jury was adequately instructed" by the instruction that the 
jury must find that the defendant "made the false statements at issue knowingly and not out 
"of mistake or accident or other innocent reason'"). The United States Supreme Court has 
also concluded that where the trial judge adequately instructs the jury on willfulness, "[a]n 
additional instruction on good faith [is] unnecessary." United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 
10,12-13,97 S.Ct. 22,24 (1976) (reviewing a conviction for willfully filing false income tax 
returns). 
The rationale of the majority rule is that a good faith instruction is not required as long 
as the jury is properly instructed on the intent element of the crime. In such cases, a "good 
faith defense instruction is merely surplusage." Gross, 961 F.2d 1103. Courts that follow 
the majority rule evaluate jury instructions "in the context of the charge as a whole," and 
recognize "no absolute right [in defendant] to the use of particular language." Dockray, 943 
F.2d at 154. As aptly observed by the First Circuit, "'[t]here is nothing so important about 
the words 'good faith' that their underlying meaning cannot otherwise be conveyed.'" Id. 
at 155 {quoting New England Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 400 F.2d 58, 71 (1st Cir. 
1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1036,89 S.Ct. 654 (1969)). "Thus," the First Circuit continued, 
"where the court properly instructs the jury on the element of intent to defraud—essentially 
the opposite of good faith—a separate instruction on good faith is not required." Id. 
Although this Court reviews for correctness a trial court's refusal to give a jury 
instruction, Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238, "the framing of instructions lies in the trial judge's -
discretion." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266. Like those courts adhering to the majority rule, this 
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Court "'review[s] jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, 
taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law/" State v. Stringham, 957 
P.2d 602,608 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083,1084 (Utah 
App.), cert denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995)); accord State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1231 (Utah 1997). The trial court need not give a proposed instruction "if the point is 
properly covered in the other instructions." State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643,647 (Utah 1982). 
"In reality, a criminal defendant's good faith defense is the affirmative converse of 
the government's burden of proving his intent to commit a crime." United States v. Kimmel, 
111 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1985). In this case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury 
regarding the intent element of communications fraud and defendant did not contend and has 
not contended otherwise. The court instructed the jury that the State must establish beyond 
a reasonable doubt that "the pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made 
or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth." GS: 244-79; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). 
In Instruction 40, attached in Addendum C, the trial court also gave detailed 
instructions regarding the three mental states under which defendants could be convicted, 
instructing the jury as follows: 
You are instructed that "intentionally" means to do something purposely 
or willfully, and with a conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result. Not accidentally or involuntarily. 
You are instructed that "knowingly" means with knowledge, or 
consciously, intelligently, willfully, or intentionally. An individual acts 
knowingly when he acts with awareness of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of 
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his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result. 
You are instructed that "reckless disregard for the truth" means that the 
defendant is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the pretenses, representations, promises or material 
omissions of the scheme or artifice to defraud are false. The risk must be of 
such nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
GS: 282. The trial court further instructed the jury in Instruction 39 as follows: 
A false or fraudulent pretense can be a false representation of fact 
calculated to induce confidence on the part of one to whom the representation 
is made, and is accompanied by a promise to do something in the future. A 
false or fraudulent pretense can also be a false representation of an existing 
fact, made with knowledge of its falsity, and which is adapted to deceive the 
person to whom it is made. 
GS: 281. The foregoing instructions embodied the applicable law and defendant has not 
contended otherwise. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1995); R. 367: 1174-78. 
The instructions covering the requisite intent were, in substance, the flip side of a 
good faith instruction, more precisely articulating the State's affirmative duty to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants did not act in good faith—that they acted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. As pointed out in 
defendants' brief, a finding of good faith negates a finding that defendants acted with the 
mental state required for communications fraud. Aplt. Brf. at 17, 19. Therefore, because 
"the point was properly covered in the other instructions" covering intent, the trial court did 
not err in refusing to give the proposed good faith instruction. Sessions, 645 P.2d at 647. In 
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short, the proposed instruction "was an unnecessary embellishment of an otherwise adequate 
statement" of the law. State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, as noted above, this Court will find a trial court's instructions adequate if 
they "g[ive] defendant the legal framework for his theory of the case." Standiford, 769 P.2d 
at 266. Instructions will be sufficient so long as they correctly state the law and "allowf] 
defendant to argue his theory of the case." Davis, 711 P.2d at 233. The instructions in this 
case clearly pass this test. In closing, defense counsel argued: 
So what you've got to ultimately decide with regards to this case: What 
did they know? What did they believe? What intent did they operate with? 
Now, I suspect that Mr. Gunnarson is going to come up and he's going 
to try to make a big thing out of the fact that, well, they don't have to 
necessarily have to know it's wrong, that, as long as it's reckless 
disregard-and you've got a definition in there for what reckless disregard 
is-then that's okay. That meets the standard for communications fraud. 
I submit to you nothing can be reckless disregard if the evidence supports 
the fact that the same conduct is widespread. If other people are doing the 
same thing and you're doing what you learned about the places, then is that a 
reckless disregard, if you have an industry-wide reckless disregard, do you 
then pull out a couple of people and say, "Okay, these are the ones we're going 
to make an example out of," some number of years later? Or if you do what 
appears that the industry was doing, do you publish articles, do you send out 
letters to people, or do you say, "This is a practice that's going on that appears 
to be improper and incorrect and we want you to fix it?" That's what you do? 
You know, I think the evidence establishes that these people operated 
in good faith, that they did what they thought was the right thing to do. They 
thought that they were coming in line and complying with the rules. 
R. 368:1395-96 (emphasis added). This argument met no objection and was consistent with 
the court's instructions on intent. Accordingly, the instructions allowed defendants to argue 
their theory of the case that they in good faith represented to the insurance carriers that Dr. 
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Walton was the service provider, or in other words, that the mis-identification of the service 
provider was not made knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
Furthermore, to the extent, if any, that someone could act with a reckless disregard 
for the truth and also act in good faith, the proposed instruction would also constitute a 
misstatement of the law, allowing defendants to avoid criminal liability for conduct 
prohibited under the statute. Defendant appears to make just such an argument in his brief, 
contending that a good faith belief need not be rationale. Aplt. Brf. at 15. However, a person 
commits communications fraud under the statute if he or she acts with reckless disregard for 
the truth. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). The jury was therefore instructed that 
defendants could be found guilty of communications fraud if they were "aware of but 
consciously disregarded] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the pretenses, 
representations, promises or material omissions of the scheme or artifice to defraud [were] 
false." GS: 282. The instruction defining intent, which was not challenged by defendant, 
further stated that "[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." GS: 282 (emphasis added). Such 
an instruction is consistent with the statutory definition of recklessness. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-103(3) (1995). Therefore, defendants' proposed good faith instruction would not be 
appropriate to the extent that it could be read to require a jury to disregard consideration of 
the standard of care "that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances 
viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id. 
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In summary, "[t]he issue of good faith was clearly placed before the jury, even if those 
precise words were not used." McGuire, 1AA F.2d at 1201. The instructions covering intent 
"conveyed the essence of a 'good faith defense' instruction, and the court's refusal to give 
the requested instruction provides no basis for reversal." McElroy, 910 F.2d at 1026. 
III. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT SUBMISSION OF THE 
CASE AGAINST GALE STRINGHAM TO THE JURY AND TO SUSTAIN 
HER CONVICTION. 
Defendant Gale Stringham contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the 
charges against her at the close of the State's case. Aplt. Brf. at 19-25.9 Alternatively, she 
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict. Aplt. Brf. at 26-29. 
This Court reviews both claims under the same standard. Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225. The 
Court will uphold the court's denial of the motion to dismiss, as well as the jury verdict, so 
long as "some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of 
the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. {citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 124 (Utah 1989)) (other citations omitted). In its review, the Court examines the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in a light most 
favorable to either the court's denial of the motion or the jury verdict. Id.; State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983). 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That the State's Evidence Was 
Sufficient to Warrant Submission of the Matter to the Jury. 
9Defendant Robert Stringham has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 
against him. Accordingly, reference to "defendant" in this point refers to Gale Stringham. 
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The State must "present some evidence of every element needed to make out a cause 
of action" to warrant submission of the matter to the jury. State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568,570 
(Utah 1985). On appeal, defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence 
pertaining to the element of intent—that she intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, represented to the insurance carriers that Dr. Walton provided or 
supervised therapy provided to the patients even though he in fact did not. Aplt. Brf. at 25. 
A review of the evidence reveals that it was more than sufficient to warrant submission of 
the matter to the jury, or, at defendant's election, to proceed with the introduction of evidence 
in her defense. 
Defendant was one of four principal organizers of UTAHS. R. 363: 131-33. She, 
together with her husband defendant Robert Stringham, controlled and directed the business. 
R. 363: 133; R. 367: 1255. The evidence further established that defendant was not only 
aware of the organization's billing practices, but also instructed others in the procedures of 
the organization's billing. For example, in the spring of 1993, Bruce and Carolyn Edwards 
went to the defendants' home to assist them in completing insurance claim forms. R. 363: 
166. At the meeting, both defendant and her husband instructed the Edwards on how to 
complete the forms. R. 363: 167. 
Although the Edwards were not instructed at the spring meeting to complete the 
signature block on the claim form—indicating who supplied the therapy, other evidence 
established defendant's role and intent in the scheme. Polly Tyacke, who assisted with 
insurance billings and made appointments for UTAHS and other providers officed in the 
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Orem building, testified that the signature block on claim forms should have only been 
stamped with the signature of the therapist who provided the counseling or of the therapist's 
supervisor. R. 364: 267-68,274. Yet, Kim Piatt, who was hired by UTAHS to help do the 
billing and trained by Tyacke, testified that both defendants instructed her to stamp Dr. 
Walton's name in the supplier block on all claim forms out of the Salt Lake office. R. 363: 
197,237, 241-42. She was so instructed even though Dr. Walton only supervised Carolyn 
Edwards, an alcohol addiction counselor, on Wednesday nights. R. 366:909-13. Dr. Walton 
did not participate in any other groups or supervise any other person. R. 363: 139; R. 366: 
912-13. Inasmuch as defendant directed and controlled the business with her husband, the 
jury could reasonably infer that defendant was well aware of Dr. Walton's limited role in the 
organization—that he only supervised Carolyn Edwards in her Wednesday night sessions. 
That defendant possessed the requisite intent in the scheme was also evidenced by two 
plans she submitted to Crime Victim Reparations. Although only her husband was charged 
in connection with these two submissions, they demonstrate defendant's motive and intent 
to defraud the insurance carriers and others paying for the counseling. A treatment plan for 
Debbie (Fisk) Frank was submitted to C VR under defendant Gale Stringham's signature. R. 
365:692; SE29. In the plan, defendant falsely represented that she had provided counseling 
for Ms. Frank under the supervision of Dr. Alldredge. R. 365:692; SE29. In fact, defendant 
Robert Stringham, with the assistance of Carolyn Edwards, provided the counseling. R. 365: 
784, 811. Likewise, a treatment plan for Lona Allen was submitted to CVR under 
defendant's signature. R. 365:689-91; SE27. As in the case of Frank, however, defendant 
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had not provided any counseling to Ms. Allen as represented in the plan, nor did she after 
submission of the plan. R. 365: 665. 
The foregoing evidence was more than sufficient to require defendant to proceed with 
her defense or submit the matter to the jury. The trial court did not therefore err in denying 
defendant's motion to dismiss for failing to establish a prima facie case. 
B. The Evidence Against Gale Stringham Was Sufficient to 
Support the Jury Verdict. 
Defendant claims in the alternative that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
jury verdict. Aplt. Brf. at 26-28. However, the evidence introduced by defendants in their 
defense only strengthened the State's case. For example, Carolyn Edwards again testified 
that both defendants instructed the Edwards on how claim forms should be completed. R. 
367:1082. Moreover, defendant acknowledged in her testimony that she knew Dr. Walton's 
stamp was being used on claim forms for patients seen in the Salt Lake office. R. 367:1257-
58, 1277-78. 
Defendant maintained that the billing under Dr. Walton's name was acceptable, 
stating her belief that claim forms are stamped, as a matter of course in the industry, by the 
medical director of a mental health care organization. R. 367:1124. In support of her claim 
that she did not have the requisite intent, defendant testified that she only became aware of 
the proper billing procedure in the summer of 1994 after reading an article in "The Utah 
Psychologist" by Dr. Chris Wehl, chairman of the Utah Psychological Association Insurance 
Committee. R. 367:1095, 1244; DE84. The article, however, cuts against defendant's 
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defense. Dr. Wehl stated that u[t]he APA Ethics Committee (1988) wrote [that]6"common 
wisdom" dictates that if the service is being performed by a psychological assistant, intern, 
or other unlicensed person, it is necessary to clearly indicate who actually provided the 
service/" DE84 (Chris K. Wehl, Insurance News, The Utah Psychologist, Summer 1994 (v. 
4 no. 10), at 15-16) (emphasis added). Accordingly, that fact was common knowledge in the 
industry as early as 1988. 
Dr. Wehl also testified for the defense. However, like the article, his testimony often 
cut against defendant's claim that she was justified in billing under Dr. Walton's name. For 
example, Dr. Wehl testified that it would be inappropriate to bill under a provider who knew 
nothing about the patient and was not supervising the therapy. R. 367: 1103. He also 
testified that it would be inappropriate to bill for therapy provided by unqualified and 
unsupervised individuals. R. 367: 1101. 
When the company first organized, UTAHS listed Dr. Roger A. Brown as its medical 
director. R. 363:140. Although Dr. Walton does not remember ever being made the medical 
director, UTAHS began representing him as such in April 1993. R. 366: 140,180; R. 366: 
949,951,958; DE41; DE73. The medical director, however, was not assigned to supervise 
others conducting therapy or counseling at UTAHS. By defendant Gale Stringham's own 
account, the medical director at UTAHS was "a physician who was willing to serve as 
someone who screened individuals for Antabuse" and see a "client that didn't have a private 
physician that might need to be evaluated for an anti-depressant." R. 367: 1159-60. As 
explained by Gale Stringham, Dr. Walton "started taking over [Dr. Brown's] Antabuse and 
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medication duties" because Dr. Walton was more accessible to patients than Dr. Brown. R. 
367: 1160. Dr. Walton acknowledged at trial that on rare occasions, he would consult a 
patient referred to him by other counselors to determine whether the patient needed to be 
prescribed an anti-depressant or Antabuse. R. 366: 914,959. However, he did not provide 
the services of a medical director as typically understood in the profession. R. 366:959. The 
evidence established that a medical director has the overall supervision of the clinical aspect 
of the operation. R. 366: 959. The director typically reviews all client charts to ensure that 
intakes have been done adequately and that appropriate treatment plans are implemented. 
R. 366: 960. The director also ensures that termination of a patient's treatment is 
appropriate. R. 366: 960. As such, even if it could be argued that claims could be 
legitimately billed under the medical director's name, Dr. Walton did not fit that description, 
regardless of the title he was given. 
Based on the foregoing evidence, it cannot be said that the evidence "was completely 
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust" and this Court should therefore affirm defendant Gale Stringham's conviction. State 




For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendants' convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this /^rvAday of June, 2000. 
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PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-103 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge91; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negli-
gence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-103, enacted by L. 










The bending down of a stop sign at an inter-
section so that it was not visible to traffic was 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980). 
The sole difference between reckless man-
slaughter and negligent homicide is whether 
the defendant actually knew of the risk of death 
or was not, but should have been, aware of it. In 
both cases, a defendant's conduct must be a 
'gross deviation" from the standard of care 
exercised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-
nary negligence, which is the basis for a civil 
action for damages, is not sufficient to consti-
tute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford, 
769 R2d 254 (Utah 1988). 
—Expert testimony. 
While expert testimony is not required to 
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant 
accused of homicide, expert testimony is re-
quired where criminal negligence is alleged and 
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the 
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden, 
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on 
other grounds, 813 R2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion 
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant 
physician's trial for negligent homicide involv-
ing the death of an infant after a premature 
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev*d on other grounds, 




OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH 76-10-1801 
76*10-1609. Prospective application. 
The amendments to the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act are prospec-
tive in nature and apply only to civil causes of action accruing after the 
effective date of this act. However, crimes committed prior to the effective 
date of this act may comprise part of a pattern of unlawful activity if at least 
one of the criminal episodes comprising that pattern occurs after die effective 
date of this act and the pattern otherwise meets the definition of pattern of 
unlawful activity as defined in Section 76-10-1602. 
History: C. 1953,1 76-10-1609, enacted by date of this act" means April 27,1987, the of-
L. 1987, ch. 238, f 7. fective date of Laws 1987, ch. 238. 
Compiler's Notes. — The phrase "effective 
PART 17 
CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECENCY ACT 
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 5, I 1.) 
76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708. Repealed. 
Repeals, — Laws 1988, ch. 5, J 1 repeals ble Television Programming Decency Act, ef-
(§ 76-10-1701 to 76-10-1708, as enacted by fective April 25, 1988. For present provisions, 
Laws 1983, ch. 207, §§ 1 to 8, entitled the Ca- see § 76-10-1229. 
PART 18 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but does not 
exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not 
exceed $10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not 
exceed $100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
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(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained 
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, 
make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to 
transmit information. Means of communication include, but are not limited 
to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, com-
puter, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted 
by the defendant were not made or omitted knowingly or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1801, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 157, t 2. 
PART 19 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CURRENCY 
TRANSACTION REPORTING 
76.10-1901. Short title. 
This part is known as the Money Laundering and Currency Transaction 
Reporting Act. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1901, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 241,1 9 
L. 1989, ch. 241, ft 1. makes the act effective on April 1, 1989. 
76-10-1902. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Conducts" includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initi-
ating or concluding a transaction. 
(2) (a) "Currency" means the coin and paper money of the United 
States or of any other country that is designated as legal tender, that 
circulates, and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of ex-
change in the country of issuance. 
(b) "Currency" includes United States silver certificates, United 
States notes, Federal Reserve notes, and foreign bank notes custom-






If you determine from the evidence that a pretense, representation, 
promise or material omission was made or omitted by the defendant, in order 
to find the defendant guilty of communications fraud, you must determine that 
it was made or omitted: 
a) intentionally; or, 
b) knowingly; or, 
c) with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
You are instructed that it is sufficient for you to find that only one of the 
three mental states listed above existed. 
You are instructed that "intentionally" means to do something purposely 
or willfully, and with a conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. Not accidentally or involuntarily. 
You are instructed that "knowingly" means with knowledge, or 
consciously, intelligently, willfully, or intentionally. An individual acts 
knowingly when he acts with awareness of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
You are instructed that "reckless disregard for the truth" means that the 
defendant is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions of the 
scheme or artifice to defraud are false. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint. 
